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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of uncertainty concerning product
quality of generic drugs on the substitution behavior of prescribing
physicians. It is shown that uncertainty about the generic drug qual-
ity gives the physician a value of waiting for more information before
switching to the generic version. In addition, it is shown that reducing
the approval requirements for generic drugs, thereby increasing uncer-
tainty about quality, may discourage physicians from prescribing such
drugs. A small empirical study supports the theoretical ﬁndings and
indicate that uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs do aﬀect
physician prescription behavior. (JEL L65, I11)
∗Financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius foundation is greatly
acknowledged.1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Policies designed to improve the eﬃciency of pharmaceutical markets have
been implemented both in the US and in Europe. The (US) Drug Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (also known as the Waxman-
Hatch Act) had two objectives: to restore the eﬀective patent terms, which
had eroded substantially over the years due to more complex and time-
consuming approval procedures (Hartley et al, 1986, and Andersson and
Hertzman, 1993) and to increase generic competition once patents expire.
In order to increase generic competition, approval procedures for generic
drugs were changed considerably. Instead of having to redo all clinical trials
themselves, a generic product can now be approved by showing that it is
bioeqivalent to the brand name product. The testing procedures required
to do this are less costly than the original safety and eﬃcacy tests that the
brand name manufacturer has to conduct. Similar changes in approval pro-
cedures have been made in Europe. In Sweden, for example, an applicant for
a license to sell a generic drug does not have to produce pharmacological and
toxicological studies if he can prove that the new pharmaceutical is equal to
another pharmaceutical product that has been approved for sale in Sweden
or another country within the European Union and is, at present, sold in
Sweden.1 As such, both US and European governments have changed the
approval procedures for generic drugs in order to increase generic entry and
competition in the pharmaceuticals market.
However, for these measures to be eﬀective, the prescribing physicians
must be willing to switch from the brand name to the generic version of the
drug. Fridman et al (1987) reports that only half of 245 surveyed physicians
believed generic drugs to be as reliable as brand name drugs. Consistent with
this result, a relatively low fraction of physicians report to prescribe generics
often, except in the case of antibiotics. Although 60 percent of physicians
often comply with patients, should patients request a generic prescription,
the impact of this is not large since patients do not often make such requests.
One factor that aﬀects the conﬁdence in the quality of generic drugs
concerns the quality control done by approving authorities such as the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In 1989 a scandal concerning bribed
employees at the FDA emerged (see e.g., Scott-Morton, 1997, 1999). The
1These procedures described follow the Medical Products Agency rule 1993:14. The
preceding rules for approval can be found in the National Board of Health and Welfare
Code of Statutes 1980:90.2
pharmaceutical company Mylan ﬁled a complaint stating that its competitors
applications received faster review than their applications. Investigations
into these accusations showed that several generic ﬁrms had been bribing
FDA reviewers in order to speed up approval.2 Gupta (1996) reports that
the increased uncertainty about the quality of generic products following the
scandal aﬀected the conﬁdence of pharmacists, physicians and consumers
using such drugs. In addition, Gupta reports that a majority of pharmacists
switched to using more brand name drugs in their personal consumption of
pharmaceuticals following the scandal.
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically and empirically analyze the
impact of uncertainty concerning generic drug quality on generic drug use.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways; First, a new
theoretical framework to analyze the physician’s prescription decision, incor-
porating uncertainty concerning the quality of generic products, is presented.
Second, given that changed approval procedures changes the physician’s be-
lief concerning generic drug quality, the theoretical model allows analysis
of such eﬀects upon the physicians prescription decision. Third, aggrega-
tion over physicians enables empirical analysis of the impact of uncertainty
concerning generic drug quality on physician prescription behavior, using
aggregated data.
In earlier studies of pharmaceuticals markets, the decision to switch from
a brand name to a generic product has been modeled as a ”now or never”
decision made by the prescribing physician. In this paper the economic value
of being able to defer the decision to switch to a later date, when more in-
formation about the quality and eﬃcacy of the generic drug is available for
the physicians, is studied. In order to do this the theories of real options,
e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994), are used.3 There are three important char-
acteristics of the problem which must be fulﬁlled for this approach to be
appropriate. First, there must exist some degree of uncertainty about the
2In addition, Scott-Morton (1997) reports that other illegal activities were discovered
during the investigations as well. Some generic ﬁrms had in fact been re-coating brand
name products and submitting them as their own for the testing procedures. Needless to
say, these products did very well in comparisons with the brand name product.
3Option pricing techniques have been used by Palmer and Smith (2000) to analyze the
eﬀects of uncertainty on economic evaluations of health care technologies in general. In
their paper, they mention uncertainty about pharmaceutical prices and/or the introduc-
tions of new pharmaceuticals as examples where option pricing techniques might be used.
In the present paper we concentrate on uncertainty concerning generic product quality
instead.3
future ”state of the world”, i.e. some uncertainty about the quality and
eﬃcacy of the generic drug. Second, the decision to switch from a brand
name drug to a generic product must entail some irreversible commitment of
resources. Finally, the physician must have some discretion as to the timing
of the switch from the brand name to the generic drug.
Along the lines of Hellerstein (1998), the prescribing physician is con-
cidered to act as an agent for the consumer of the drug (generic or brand
name). In addition, the physician is assumed to internalize a proportion
of the patients utility because of direct pecuniary incentives to do so (e.g.,
the fear of loosing the patient to another physician), or because of altruistic
considerations. As such, the physician must weigh costs and beneﬁts when
deciding which product to prescribe, brand name or generic. If the physi-
cian switches to a generic drug which is ineﬃcient (or even harmful) this
will reﬂect back on the physician. Since the drug is already consumed by
the patient, the negative pharmacological eﬀects on the patient are indeed
irreversible, i.e. the cost of the decision to switch is in this sense irreversible.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model
is derived under the assumption that the physician acts as an agent for the
consumer. In addition, Section 2 presents comparative statistics and impli-
cations for the utility maximization problem of the prescribing physician,
as well as a method for aggregation across physicians. Section 3 presents
empirical results incorporating uncertainty in the brand name versus generic
prescription decision. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2T h e m o d e l
In accordance with Hellerstein (1998) consider physician j as an agent (for
patient i) who prescribes the form of the drug (generic or brand name).
Assume that patient i is currently using the brand name drug. Deﬁne the
physicians appropriately discounted expected utility, Ujt, and discounted ex-
pected disutility, Djt, of changing dispensing habits from the brand name to
the generic drug.4 The utility of the switch is a function of the utility gained
4Ujt is the expected discounted utility of switching to the generic drug at time t.T h e







where uit(p4)i sp a t i e n ti:s utility of switching to the generic drug at time t.
This utility is due to the positive diﬀerence between the price of the brand
name drug, pbr, and the price of the generic drug, pg, i.e. p4 = pbr −pg > 0.
The patients (and the physicians) utility is assumed increasing in the price
diﬀerential, i.e. ∂U
∂p4 > 0. The proportion of the patients utility/disutility
that is internalized by the physician is given by 0 ≤ γj ≤ 1. The physician
may internalize a proportion of the patients utility/disutility because of direct
pecuniary incentives to do so or because of altruistic considerations. The
(subjective) discount rate is given by ρ. The disutility of switching to the






where vit(q4)=φit is patient i:s disutility of switching to the generic drug due
to the expected positive diﬀerence in quality, q4 = qbr−qg ≥ 0. The patients
(and the physicians) disutility is assumed increasing in the expected quality
diﬀerential, i.e. ∂D
∂q4 > 0. The physician is assumed to know the true quality
of the brand name drug, qbr, from prior experience (assumed for simplicity to
be constant over time), as well as the current expected quality of the generic
drug, qg. Future values of qg is, however, not known due to uncertainty about
the true quality of the generic drug. The uncertainty about future quality
(or true quality) of the generic drug arises because the physician has no prior
experience of the drug combined with less strict approval requirements for
generic drugs. Finally, cj represents an exogenous switching cost, e.g., time
spent searching for generic alternatives.
Assume that the physician has the ability to delay the decision of switch-
ing to the generic drug rather than making a prompt decision. This option
would give the physician an opportunity to wait for more information about
5It is possible to include parameters reﬂecting wheather the patient has insurance
covering the full, or part of the cost of the drug, and also parameters reﬂecting physicians
taking social resposibility for health care costs. One might also include other direct costs
or beneﬁts associated with the decision. This will however not aﬀect the main analysis in
this paper.5
t h et r u eq u a l i t yo ft h eg e n e r i cd r u g .T h ed e c i s i o nt os w i t c hi so fc o u r s er e -
versible, but the disutility absorbed given a switch to the generic drug, if
the generic drug quality turn out bad, is assumed to be irreversible.6 As-
sume, for simplicity, that Ujt is constant over time. The disutility absorbed
by the patient from the expected lower generic quality is assumed to evolve
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eg e o m e tric Brownian motion
dφit = αφitdt + σφitdzt (3)
where dzt is the increment of a Wiener process, σ the volatility coeﬃcient and
α the drift rate. The equation implies that the current expected disutility
absorbed by the patient, φit, of the decision to switch to the generic drug
is known to the physician. Future values are, however, uncertain due to
the uncertainty concerning generic drug quality. The changes of the process
are lognormally distributed with a variance growing linearly with the time
horizon. Since the Brownian motion is a Markov process no other current
or past information (past values of φit)a ﬀect the current value. Thus, φit+1
is aﬀected only by φit. It is assumed that the physician’s expectation about
the disutility absorbed by the patient at time t already contains (implicitly)
all the relevant information from the past providing the physician with a
necessary base for his/her decision. A negative drift rate, α < 0, is assumed,
i.e. the patients disutility from using the generic drug, on average, decreases
over time, to make the problem relevant. If the disutility where growing
(α > 0) the physician would never switch to the generic drug. Since the
physicians disutility of switching to the generic drug is a proportion of the
disutility absorbed by the patient this implies (assuming γj constant over
time) that Djt evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion,
dDjt = αDjtdt + σDjtdzt.( 4 )
The value of the physician’s option to switch to the generic drug, at t =0 ,
is denoted F(Dj). The physician’s objective is to choose the time to switch,








6Irreversibility in the decision processes (or sunk costs) in combination with uncertainty
about future costs or beneﬁts, regarding a decision, creates an option value of waiting.
See e.g., MacDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994).6
subject to (3). The absolute value of the drift rate is assumed to be less than
the discount rate, i.e. |α| < ρ, since otherwise the solution of the optimal
decision would be to wait until Djt =0 . The physician’s decision rule will
take the form of a critical value D∗
j such that it is optimal to switch once
Djt ≤ D∗
j.F o rv a l u e so fDjt >D ∗
j the optimal action will be to wait.
The Bellman equation7 for this optimal stopping problem in continuous
time is given by
F(Djt)=m a x {(Ujt − Djt),(1 + ρdt)
−1E[F(Djt + dDjt)]}, (6)
where (Ujt−Djt) is the value of an immediate switch. In the waiting region,
Djt >D ∗
j, the second term is the larger of the two. Rewriting this term gives
the equation governing the value of the option to switch,
ρF(Djt)dt = E [dF(dDjt)]. (7)
This equation states that over a time interval dt, the total expected gain of
holding the option to switch, is equal to its expected rate of appreciation, due
to improved knowledge about the generic drug quality. Using Ito’s lemma









∂Djt and F00(Djt)= ∂2F
∂D2
jt. Substituting (3) for dDjt and
taking the expected value gives8









where the second term follows because the variance of Djt is of order dt.
Substitution of (8) into (6) gives the Bellman equation (after dividing by dt)








0(Djt)Djt − ρF(Djt)=0 . (10)
7Assuming an inﬁnite time horizon for the decision problem simpliﬁes the analysis,
since this implies independence from time t as such. This means that the calender time
by itself has no eﬀect. The Bellman equation or value function is then common for all
periods, although it will be evaluated at diﬀerent points Djt.
8Note that E(dz) = 0 and that terms of higher order than dt vanishes in the limit. We
assume an inﬁnite time horizon and that α and σ is independent of time. By assuming
this the problem is simpliﬁed resulting in an ordinary diﬀerential equation instead of a
stochastic.7
The value of the option to switch to the generic drug satisﬁes this equation













The ﬁrst boundary condition describes that zero is an absorbing state for
the geometric Brownian motion, i.e. if the disutility of changing to the
generic drug becomes zero it will stay at zero, and the value of the option to
switch is simply Uj. The second condition describes that when the disutility
grows enough, the probability of reaching D∗
j goes to zero, and the value of
the switch option goes to zero. The third condition is the ”value-matching
condition” expressing the fact that at the optimal trigger level of disutility
the pay-oﬀ is simply the net utility pay-oﬀ. The fourth condition is the
”smooth pasting condition”, e.g., Dixit (1993).












2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 . (12)










]2 +2 ρ/σ2,i =1 ,2. (13)




where A2 and D∗
j are still to be determined. Utilizing the value-matching
















The critical value D∗
j, at which it is optimal to switch to the generic drug, is
a fraction of the utility gained by the switch since 0 <
β2
(β2−1) < 1. Note that
β2 is the negative root of the fundamental equation. The implication of this
is that uncertainty of the generic drug quality creates a value of waiting for
more information. For comparison the optimal behavior without uncertainty
would be to switch when Djt ≤ Ujt.
The optimal time to switch (e.g., Oksendal, 1995) is given by τ∗
j,w h e r e
τ
∗
j =i n f
n






j is the ﬁrst time at which the physicians disutility exit the in-
terval (∞,D ∗
j). If Dj0 ≤ D∗
j,t h e nE(τ∗
j) = 0, and an immediate switch
to the generic drug is the optimal behavior. Now instead assume that
Dj0 ∈ (∞,D ∗
j), i.e. the option to wait has a positive value. Using Ito’s
Lemma (e.g., Ito and Mckean, 1965) one q u a t i o n( 3 ) ,o n ec a ns h o wt h a tt h e
value of the physicians disutility of switching to the generic drug at time
t ≥ 0, starting at Dj0,i sg i v e nb yDjt = Dj0 exp(α − 1/2σ2)t + σzt.F r o m





















2.1 Comparative statistics and implications
One of the main objectives of this paper is to study how the physician’s
optimal prescription behavior is aﬀected by changes in uncertainty concerning


























i2 > 0( 2 0 )9
This means that increased uncertainty about future disutility of switching
to the generic drug will decrease the optimal critical switching value and,
hence, increase the expected time until switching.9
If physicians believe generic drugs to be less reliable than brand name
drugs (as reported by Fridman et al 1987), changes in approval procedures
for generic drugs might have unintended consequences. If changes in approval
procedures increase uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs, this will
make physicians more reluctant (i.e. wait longer) to prescribe generic drugs.
This negative eﬀect reduces the intended positive eﬀects on generic entry
and generic competition of changed approval procedures. As such, the total
eﬀects of changed approval procedures on generic entry and generic compe-
tition is a question for empirical research.10
2.2 Aggregating across physicians
The theoretical model presented above applies to the individual prescribing
physicians, whereas available data only makes it possible to study behavior
at an aggregated level. As such, aggregation across physicians has to be
considered. Given that a physician prescribed the brand name drug prior to





jt ≥ 0( 2 1 )
Assuming heterogeneity concerning physicians level of internalization, (γj),
of the patients disutility of using the generic drug, each physician will face a
unique decision problem subject to their own individual speciﬁc motions of
disutility, Dj. This implies that comparing the optimal switching levels, D∗
9Note that this corresponds rather well to what happened in the US market after
the generic drug scandal, according to Gupta (1996). He found that increased uncertainty
about generic drug quality made pharmacists use more brand name drugs after the scandal,
at least for personal use.
10Grabowski and Vernon (1992, 1996) have studied the eﬀects of the 1984 Waxman-
Hatch act. The act was designed to promote price competition by introducing an abbrevi-
ated new drug application process for generic drugs, while restoring some of the eﬀective
patent time for brand name drugs. They report that after the 1984 act, the average generic
market share has increased in the US pharmaceuticals market, indicating that the price
eﬀect might have outweighed the eﬀect of increased uncertainty concerning the quality of
generic drugs.10
for two physicians may not reveal who will switch to the generic drug ﬁrst.11
To be able to relate the decision described in equation (17) to the change of
market share of the brand name drug, the attention is instead turned to the
expected time to switch.
Assume that expected switching times, τ, among physicians who has not
prior switched to the generic drug, have, at time t, a distribution given by R ∞
t g(τ) dτ. Assume this distribution to be the same for all periods and
independent of the market share of the brand name drug. The expected
share of physicians switching to the generic drug during the discrete time
period t to t+1isthengivenby
R t+1
t g(τ)dτ. Formally, the change of market
s h a r eo ft h eb r a n dn a m ed r u gm a yn o wb er e l a t e dt ot h es h a r eo fp h y s i c i a n s








= h(p4,q 4,c,σ,α)( 2 2 )
where st is the share of physicians patronizing the brand name drug at time
t. Equation (22) gives the relative change of market share for the brand name
drug as a function of the parameters aﬀecting the distribution of switching
times. All variables aﬀecting the utility of the physician as presented by
equation (1), and the disutility as presented by equation (2), will enter the
analysis by aﬀecting the distribution of τ∗ through D and D∗ = Uβ2/(β2−1).
Note that increased uncertainty about generic drug quality aﬀects equation
(22) by shifting the mean of the switching time distribution to the right.
Fewer prescribing physicians will then reach their critical value during (t,t+1)
and switch from brand name to generic substitutes. This means that brand
name loss of market share will be slower for drugs where uncertainty is large
and/or increases. Variables increasing the utility of switching to a generic
product will make the loss of brand name market share more dramatic, while
the opposite is true for variables who increases the disutility of the switch.
11Al o w e rD∗ may not imply a longer waiting period before switching, since the starting
value Dj0 is unique for each physician (due to diﬀerent γj among physicians). Hence, an
aggregation approach building on distributional assumptions of D∗
j, see Aronsson et al
(2001), is inappropriate in the current setting.11
3 Empirical test
Physicians perceptions of the quality of generic drugs are obviously not eas-
ily observable and an uncer t a i n t ym e a s u r ei st h u sd i ﬃcult to construct. The
available data do not contain any measure concerning changes in uncertainty
of generic drug quality over time. To test whether uncertainty aﬀects physi-
cian prescription behavior, the strategy is therefore to compare pharmaceuti-
cals with diﬀerent levels of uncertainty concerning generic quality. Assuming
that a higher level of uncertainty mainly aﬀects the generic versions of the
drug (since the prescribing physician has prior experience with the brand
name version), brand name drugs for substances with a high level of un-
certainty should lose market share to generics more slowly. As such, the
empirical test procedure will use a substance related measure of the uncer-
tainty concerning generic drug quality, σ, while trying to control for all other
factors (i.e. p4,q 4,c,α)a ﬀecting physician prescription behavior.
3.1 Data
Quarterly time-series data of prices and quantities for each brand name prod-
uct and its generic substitutes from 1972 to 1996 are used in this study. These
data have been provided by the Swedish Medical Product Agency (SMPA)
a n dc o v e r5o f1 4d i ﬀerent ﬁelds of use, as deﬁned by the SMPA. The data
refers to twelve diﬀerent substances, all of which have a minimum sale of ten
thousand packages each quarter for the chosen package size.12 The price of
generic products used in the estimations is the average price of generic sub-
stitutes in each submarket, measured as a quantity weighted average. Table
1 reports the average market share (measured in quantity) as well as means
and standard deviations for the relative prices (i.e. the price of the brand
name product relative to the average price of the generic substitutes) for each
original substance and its generic substitutes during the considered period.
12The products used in the study refer to the dose and package size with the largest
registered sales.12
Table 1: Market shares and relative prices.
Substance M-share M-share Relative price
Brand Generic (std. dev)
Cimetedine 64.57% 35.43% 1.62 (0.66)
Furosemide 47.40% 52.60% 1.57 (0.45)
Atenolol 85.51% 14.49% 1.58 (0.44)
Pindolol 97.63% 2.37% 1.36 (0.18)
Propranolol 96.98% 3.02% 1.87 (0.55)
Indomethacine 63.56% 36.44% 1.15 (0.10)
Naproxen 44.30% 55.70% 1.44 (0.37)
Allopurinol 93.03% 6.97% 1.33 (0.22)
Paracetamol/
Codeine 92.85% 7.15% 1.23 (0.10)
Diazepam 41.68% 58.32% 1.17 (0.12)
Clomipramine 39.53% 60.47% 1.44 (0.19)
Timolol 82.08% 17.92% 1.75 (0.40)
Note: The ﬁgures in the table refer to average market shares
and relative prices (pbr/pg)during the estimation period.
3.2 The regression model
The empirical model is speciﬁed as
sit − sit−1
sit−1




it)+β2 GENit + β3DREF
+ β4 ADS it + β5UNC+ uit (23)
where uit is a random term, assumed to be i.i.d. across substances, and
where αj are ﬁxe ﬀects. These ﬁxed eﬀects represents the ﬁve ﬁelds of use,
j =1 ,...,5, (as deﬁned by the SMPA) and are assumed to capture diﬀerences
in treatment times, the severity of the underlying disease etc. The term T
represents a time trend to capture the trend in the stochastic quality pro-
cess described in equation (3). pbr
it/p
g
it represents the relative price diﬀerence
between the brand name drug and the generic version, and is deﬁned as the
price of the brand name drug, pbr, over the average price of the generic sub-
stitutes, pg. The number of generic versions of the pharmaceutical substance
in question is measured by the variable GENit, assumed to capture changes13
and diﬀerences in the switching cost, c,w h i l eDREF is a dummy variable
representing the introduction of the Swedish reference price system in 1993.
The system limits the reimbursement to patients who purchase pharmaceuti-
cals to 110 percent of the price of the least-cost identical generic alternative.
Before 1993, the patient had to pay all cost below 120 SEK themselves,
while costs exceeding 120 SEK were borne by the National Social Insurance
Board (NSIB). After paying a total of 1500 SEK, all costs were reimbursed by
the NSIB. In addition, the policies for registration of generic products were
changed in 1993 in order to make it easier for generic manufacturers to enter
t h em a r k e t .T h ed u m m yv a r i a b l eDREF thus capture a net eﬀect on brand
name market share caused by increased uncertainty, σ, and of decreased
switching costs, c, caused by the introduction of the new reimbursement and
approval procedures. However, as this variable measures a net eﬀect of the
new reimbursement system and changed approval procedures, it cannot be
used in order to test the theoretical model presented above.
ADS it represents the number of ads in L¨ akartidningen13 for the brand
name pharmaceutical in relation to the total number of ads for that pharma-
ceutical substance, brand name and gen e r i c ,a n di su s e da sap r o x yi no r d e r
to control for diﬀerences in quality (i.e. q4) between brand name drugs and
generics. This follows from the signaling model developed by Spence (1973).
High quality producers of a pharmaceutical product uses advertising as an
instrument to signal high quality, if their cost of using this instrument is lower
than for the low quality producer. As pharmaceuticals are experience goods,
producers will not receive repeat purchases if quality is low, making the cost
of using advertising as a signaling device high for low quality producers. (see
e.g., Tirole, 1988 p 119).14
Finally, UNC measures uncertainty about the quality of the generic drug.
This is measured in four diﬀerent ways, relating to models one to four be-
low. The three ﬁrst measures are dummy variables, while the fourth is a
continuous variable. The ﬁrst two measures, UNC1 and UNC2, are related
to those pharmaceutical substances who have been reported for side-eﬀects
during the last six years and who are made public in the SMPA’s compilation
13L¨ akartidningen is a weekly medical journal directed towards physicians in Sweden.
This is the largest oﬃcial journal where prescription pharmaceuticals are advertised in the
Swedish market, reaching approximately 90 percent of the prescribing physicians.
14It should be noted that the number of ads might aﬀect the switching cost, c,i nt h e
theoretical model as well. As such, the number of ads is likely to measure the net eﬀect
of advertising on quality diﬀerences and switching costs.14
and assessment of side-eﬀects reported from the healthcare sector.15 The ﬁrst
measure, UNC1, represents those substances in the sample which have been
reported to the SMPA for having side-eﬀects (1 = side eﬀects). The second
measure, UNC2, also includes substances which have been reported by the
SMPA for side-eﬀects when used in combination with other pharmaceutical
products. A third measure, UNC3, includes all pharmaceutical substances
which have the same four ﬁgure ATC-code16 as those pharmaceuticals which
are included in our second measure, UNC2. Finally, a fourth uncertainty
measure is constructed by counting the reported number of rare side-eﬀects
in FASS17 in relation to the total number of side eﬀects.
3.3 Empirical results
Four diﬀerent versions of equation (22), relating to the diﬀerent uncertainty
measures, UNC1 to UNC4, are estimated. Comparison of the results for
estimators accounting for the unbalanced panel structure with estimators
not accounting for this, indicate no qualitative diﬀerences.18 The initial
estimations indicate a signiﬁcant autocorrelation in the residuals at lag 2,
for all speciﬁcations. Since robust (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation)
covariance estimators for the unbalanced case are not readily availably19,a n d
since the eﬀect of the unbalanced panels are small, estimation techniques not
accounting for the unbalanced panel structure were used. A Newey-West
(1987) covariance estimator (lag 2) has been utilized. The results from the
regressions are reported in Table 2.20
15Two substances, Allopurinol and Propranolol, have been reported for side eﬀects, while
Paracetamol have been reported for side eﬀects in combination with other pharmaceuticals.
These reports (in Swedish) can be found on the SMPA website at the following address:
http://www.mpa.se/biverkningar/biv02/bivmain02.shtml
16The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classiﬁcation system divides drugs into
diﬀerent groups according to the organ or system on which they act and their chemical,
pharmacological and therapeutic properties.
17FASS is a physicians guide to pharmaceutical products sold in the Swedish pharma-
ceuticals market.
18The models were estimated with least squares techniques utilizing the LIMDEP soft-
ware package.
19A least squares estimator accounting for the unbalanced panel structure was estimated
for models including an AR(1) error structure. The estimation results were similar to those
reported in Table 2.
20The ﬁxed eﬀects have been left out in order to save space.15
Table 2: Estimation results. (Standard errors in paranthesis)
Variable UNC1 UNC2 UNC3 UNC4
T 0.675×10−4∗ 0.102×10−3 0.262×10−3 0.628×10−5




it -0.032∗ -0.033∗ -0.031∗ -0.027∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
GENit -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DREF -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
ADS it -0.14×10−4 -0.810×10−5 0.345×10−4 -0.272×10−4
(0.279×10−4) (0.297×10−4)( 0 . 3 4 2 ×10−4)( 0 . 3 0 9 ×10−4)
UNC 0.023∗ 0.023∗ 0.030∗ 0.011
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Based on theory, the following results are expected when estimating the
above model. First, the relative price diﬀerence is expected to have a neg-
ative eﬀect on the loss of brand name market share, i.e. if the brand name
product is priced high relative to the generics, the utility gained by switch-
ing will be large and physicians will substitute away from the brand name
product. Second, the brand name product will lose market shares faster if
more generic versions enter the market, i.e. the parameter estimate of β2 is
expected to be negative. The motivation for this is that the switching cost
included in the disutility, as presented by equation (3), will decrease in the
number of generics, i.e. less time has to be spent searching for a generic al-
ternative. Third, if the brand name product is heavily advertised compared
to the generic versions of the product, this is assumed to be a signal that
the brand name product is of high quality, and the brand name product is
expected to lose market share more slowly.21 Fourth, the introduction of the
Swedish reference price system is assumed to lower the switching costs, while
increasing the uncertainty concerning generic drug quality. Thus, the sign of
the parameter β3 is ambigous. Fifth, as the number of ads in L¨ akartidningen
is used as a proxy for quality diﬀerences, where heavily advertised pharma-
ceuticals are assumed to be of high quality, the parameter β4 is assumed to be
negative. Finally, the parameter estimate for β5 is expected to be positive if
21Note that this will also be the case if the advertising of brand name products increase
the switching cost of the prescribing physicians.16
uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs are higher for those substances
included in our uncertainty measures. This means that the physicians will
have a higher value of waiting for more information concerning the quality
of generic products for these substances. This should especially be true for
those pharmaceuticals which have been reported to the SMPA for having
side-eﬀects. The ”wait-and-see” strategy will lead to a slower loss of market
share for the brand name product for these substances.
The relative price parameter is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level in all four models. The estimates concerning the number
of generic versions and the introduction of the reference price system are
negative as expected, but not statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, advertising
intensity of the brand name product does not seem to aﬀect the loss of market
share for such products in any signiﬁcant way.
The estimates for the uncertainty parameter is positive in all four models.
In the ﬁrst three models, where diﬀerent dummy variable constructions are
used to measure uncertainty, the estimates are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent
level. This indicates that uncertainty concerning generic drug quality aﬀect
the prescribing physicians decision, whether to switch to the generic drug or
not, according to the theory.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In earlier studies of pharmaceuticals markets, the decision to switch from
a brand name to a generic product has been modeled as a ”now or never”
decision made by the prescribing physician. In this paper, the economic
value for the physicians of being able to defer the decision to switch to a
later date, when more information about the quality of the generic drug
is available, is studied. This is accomplished by means of a real options
theoretical approach, in which it is shown that uncertainty about generic
drug quality gives the physician a value of waiting before switching to the
generic drug. The physicians optimal behavior is thus to wait longer before
prescribing the generic drug, compared to a situation where generic drug
quality is known with certainty. This theoretical prediction coincides with the
ﬁndings of Gupta (1996), following the generic drug scandal in the US in 1989.
The scandal aﬀected the physicians and pharmacists conﬁdence in generic
drug quality and the pharmacists included in the study by Gupta reported
to have increased their use of brand name drugs, at least for personal use,17
following the scandal. In addition, the small empirical study on Swedish data
supports the theoretical ﬁndings in this paper and indicate that uncertainty
about the quality of generic drugs do aﬀect physician prescription behavior.
The theoretical approach allows analysis of the eﬀects of changed approval
procedures on generic drug use as well. Reducing the approval requirements
for generic drugs to enhance competition, as has been done in several coun-
tries, could at the same time increase uncertainty about the generic drug
quality. If this is the case, our model predicts that these changes will actually
discourage physicians from prescribing generic drugs, ceteris paribus. The
studies of the introduction of the Waxman-Hatch act in 1984 by Grabowski
and Vernon (1992, 1996) indicates that the price eﬀect outweighed the ef-
fects of increased uncertainty concerning generic drug quality on physician
prescription behavior. However, this study suggests that the eﬀects of the
act could have been larger, if policies also had been aimed at minimizing
uncertainty concerning generic drug quality.18
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The wedge between D∗






2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 .
To understand how the critical value is aﬀected by uncertainty totally diﬀer-




















= σβ(β − 1) > 0
where β2 < 0, σ ≥ 0a n dα ≤ 0. This implies that
∂β2
∂σ > 0, (i.e. becomes
less negative) and thus that
β2
(β2−1) decreases.














































since α − 1
2σ2 < 0,D ∗
j ≤ Dj0 and D ´ ´ ∗
j(σ)=∂D∗
j/∂σ < 0. Rewriting and


















Since exp(x>0) > 1a n dD∗
j ≤ Dj0 the inequality must hold.19
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